[Vid-stund] Málstofa í Hagfræðideild: Humans and robots: Testing the Nash Equilibrium's predictive power and limitations in an endogenous grouping game, föstudaginn 30. sept kl. 11:00

[Bjargey Anna Guðbrandsdóttir]

Málstofa í Hagfræðideild: Humans and robots: Testing the Nash 
Equilibrium's predictive power and limitations in an endogenous grouping 
game

Gunnthorsdottir, Vragov, Seifert & McCabe (2010) introduce a 
multiple-level variation of a standard social dilemma game, called 
?Group-based Meritocracy Mechanism? (GBM). In a GBM, players compete for 
membership in stratified teams based on the social contribution they make. 
The GBM has a complicated, asymmetric, highly efficient equilibrium that 
is hard to detect. Nonetheless, experimental subjects manage to coordinate 
this equilibrium without consciously knowing the solution, without 
communicating, via simultaneous decisions, and apparently without 
learning. 
I will present tests of robustness of the above-mentioned findings as well 
as extensions of the model that account for commonly encountered social 
situations. Results indicate the superiority and ?naturalness? of 
merit-based hiring and organization over social organization based on 
race, cliquishness, and the like. 

Anna Gunnþórsdóttir er gestaprófessor við Wirtschaftsuniversität í Vín

Staður og stund:
Oddi, gundarherbergi 3. hæð
Föstudaginn 30. sept kl. 11:00
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