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<br><font size=3 face="sans-serif"><b>Málstofa í Hagfræðideild: Humans
and robots: Testing the Nash Equilibrium's predictive power and limitations
in an endogenous grouping game</b></font>
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<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Gunnthorsdottir, Vragov, Seifert &
McCabe (2010) introduce a multiple-level variation of a standard social
dilemma game, called “Group-based Meritocracy Mechanism” (GBM). In a
GBM, players compete for membership in stratified teams based on the social
contribution they make. The GBM has a complicated, asymmetric, highly efficient
equilibrium that is hard to detect. Nonetheless, experimental subjects
manage to coordinate this equilibrium without consciously knowing the solution,
without communicating, via simultaneous decisions, and apparently without
learning. </font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">I will present tests of robustness of
the above-mentioned findings as well as extensions of the model that account
for commonly encountered social situations. Results indicate the superiority
and “naturalness” of merit-based hiring and organization over social
organization based on race, cliquishness, and the like. </font>
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<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif"><b>Anna Gunnþórsdóttir er gestaprófessor
við Wirtschaftsuniversität í Vín</b></font>
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<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Staður og stund:</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Oddi, gundarherbergi 3. hæð</font>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Föstudaginn 30. sept kl. 11:00</font>